A common method of valuing the equity in leveraged transactions is the flows-toequity method whereby the free cash flow available to equity holders is discounted at the cost of equity. This method uses a standard definition of equity free cash flow, but the cost of equity varies over time as leverage varies. Various formulas can be used to calculate the time-varying cost of equity, most of which are inconsistent with the assumptions underlying the free cash flow calculation. In this paper we show how to include correctly the following in the flows-to-equity method:
Introduction
The general topic of this paper is the valuation of investments that have fixed debt plans. In other words, at the time of the valuation the future amount of debt is a function of time alone. The amount of debt is not expected to fluctuate with the future value of the investment. This type of situation arises in LBO's (Baldwin 2001a) , project finance (Esty 1999) , and other highly leveraged transactions (HLT's) where the future amortisation of the debt has been agreed at the time of the investment. Our focus is especially on valuing the equity in such investments directly through the "flows-to-equity" method, whereby the project's equity free cash flows are discounted at the cost of levered equity. This method focuses directly on the cash flows equityholders will actually receive rather than valuing equity indirectly as the difference between total project value and debt, as under the standard adjusted present value approach.
As emphasized by Esty, the cost of equity is time varying in investments with fixed debt plans, since leverage and thus also the risk of equity changes over time as the debt plan unfolds. It is therefore necessary to use a time varying discount rate when using the flows-to-equity method in investments with fixed debt plans. The correct way to do this is to calculate an implied market value leverage ratio and releverage the cost of equity to reflect this changing leverage ratio at each future date.
We make three main points. First, the standard way of releveraging the cost of equity for use in the flows-to-equity approach is inconsistent with the assumption of a fixed debt plan. This inconsistency can lead to significant undervaluation of the equity. We show how to calculate the cost of equity consistent with an evolving fixed debt plan.
Second, the most commonly used method of implementing the flows-to-equity method implicitly assumes that the entire debt spread results in negative NPV whereas, in reality, a large part of it is compensation for the risk of debt. We show how to incorporate this into the flows-to-equity method. Failure to do so also leads to undervaluation of the equity. Third, we show how to incorporate other effects of the financing plan in a way that is consistent with the present value of the tax saving from debt, including the present value of financial distress costs and debt that is expensive in the sense that its yield exceeds fair compensation for credit risk. We also discuss the more general issue of the conditions under which it is reasonable to assume a fixed debt plan.
The topic is important because the combination of a fixed debt plan and valuation using flows-to-equity is common in practice. There are several advantages which account for its popularity (Esty 1999 , Baldwin 2001a . In particular, the flows-toequity approach:
• can allow for time-varying debt, which is inconsistent with a constant WACC;
• can allow for time-varying effective tax rates in a simple way;
• can accommodate debt which is not issued at its fair price (including expensive or subsidised debt);
• can easily allow for several rounds of equity financing;
• focuses directly on the cash flows that accrue to equity-holders.
In order to implement the flows-to-equity method a formula is needed with which to releverage the cost of equity at each future date (Baldwin (2001b) ). There are two such releveraging formulas in common use. One formula is consistent with debt being a constant proportion of the firm's market value, the assumption which underlies the WACC (see Miles-Ezzell (1980) , "ME"). The formula for releveraging the cost of equity consistent with a constant leverage ratio (continuously adjusted) is:
where R E is the cost of equity, R U is the unlevered cost of equity, R D is the cost of debt, D is the market value of debt, and E is the market value of equity.
The other common releveraging formula is consistent with a fixed amount of debt (see Miller and Modigliani (1963) "MM"). The formula for releveraging the cost of equity consistent with this assumption is:
where T is the corporate tax rate. In this paper we ignore the effect of investor taxes.
In practice these two formulas are used in a variety of forms. For instance, both Esty (1999) and Baldwin (2001b) use a simplified version of (1). They use the CAPM, so
An important feature of all the above formulas is that none is based on a debt policy whereby the amount of debt is scheduled to change over time in a predetermined manner, the policy that will actually be pursued in a typical HLT. In some applications such inconsistency does not matter because the use of a releveraging formula inconsistent with the debt policy which will actually be pursued does not have a material effect on the valuation (see Cooper and Nyborg 2007) . However, in
HLT's the tax benefit of debt is a first order component of value. Therefore, treating this element of the valuation in a consistent way is important. In this paper we show how to do this and calculate the size of the resulting adjustment to the present value.
In addition to the issue of consistency between the releveraging formula and the leverage policy, there is another issue of consistency. This concerns the yield spread on the borrowing, the measure of equity free cash flow used, and the releveraging formula. The commonly used formula (3) assumes that debt is riskless. The use of equation (3) therefore implicitly assumes that the entire yield spread on the debt results in a negative NPV from borrowing. However, a large part of the yield spread in HLT's is simply compensation for the risk of debt. A valuation method which treats the entire yield spread as implying that debt is expensive will give an underestimate of value. We show how to deal with this correctly and the effect of this on present value.
There are two other value effects of leverage which can be significant in HLT's. The first is debt which is expensive, in the sense of having a yield that exceeds the fair yield required to compensate for credit risk. One benefit of the flows-to-equity approach is that, unlike other valuation approaches, it does not assume that debt is issued at a fair price (from the equity-holder's perspective). The other issue is the expected cost of financial distress, which can be substantial at the leverage ratios used in HLT's. We generalize the model to include negative NPV debt as well as costs of financial distress.
We illustrate our results using the realistic example studied by Esty (1999). Esty's example has the key features of project finance and LBO's: a relatively large amount of debt, relatively high margins on the debt, and a fixed debt plan. We show how to include in his valuation the four elements discussed above:
• A releveraging formula consistent with a fixed debt plan;
• A yield spread on debt which is fair compensation for default risk;
• The part of the yield spread which is "excessive";
• The expected cost of financial distress.
We show that each of these can have a significant effect on valuation and the value derived in a consistent way can differ substantially from that derived by more conventional procedures.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a simple example of the incorrect valuation that may result from from using the flows-to-equity approach with the standard cost of equity formulas. In Section 3 we derive our basic releveraging formula and related results, assuming zero NPV debt and no financial distress costs, and show that this gives the correct answer in the simple example in Section 2.
Section 4 extends the analysis to include negative NPV debt and costs of financial distress. Section 5 shows the size of the effects using a realistic numerical model, and Section 6 gives the conclusions.
Numerical example of incorrect valuations using standard formulas in the flows-to-equity method
As a motivation for the subsequent analysis, in this section we present an example that illustrates the misvaluation that may result in the flows-to-equity method when using the standard releveraging formulas given in the Introduction [equations (1), (2), and (4)]. We do this by comparing values calculated using the flows-to-equity method to the correct value as calculated from a standard two-step adjusted present value approach. The parameters are: Corporate tax rate, T: 35%; Yield on debt, Y:
5.00%; Riskfree rate, R F : 3.00%; Unlevered cost of equity, R U : 9.00%. The equity cash flows are the operating cash flows plus the tax saving from interest minus the debt flows. The initial equity value is equal to the unlevered value, V U , plus the present value of the tax shield (PVTS), i.e., the project's adjusted net present value (APV). Thus, V U is the project's net present value (NPV), calculated by discounting the operating cash flow at the unlevered cost of equity. The present value of the tax shield is calculated by discounting projected interest payments at the yield of the debt. Cooper and Nyborg (2008) show that this is consistent with no arbitrage, given certain assumptions about the default process for the debt (see Section 3).
Panel B of Table 1 computes the value of the investment using the standard implementation of the flows-to-equity method as laid out by Esty (1999) . This is derived as follows. From Panel A one first inputs the equity cash flows and the debt plan. In the R E column, one enters the releveraging formula to be used, in this case (4).
In the PV equity column, one enters the equity value (ex cash flow) caculated assuming last period's equity value grows at R E . For example, the PV equity at date 1 is 27.3335 1.2876 7.075 28.1185
The value of the equity is solved iteratively by choosing an initial end of period equity value (the first row in the fourth column)
so that the sum of the discounted equity cash flows equals that equity value less the initial equity outflow.
As seen, the solution when using (4) as the releveraging formula, is 17.3335, which is 17.42% below the correct APV value as calculated in Panel A. The calculated value is below the unleveraged value, implying a negative value of PVTS. To illustrate the effect of using a different cost of equity formula, if the MM formula (2) is used as the releveraging formula it gives a computed equity value of 23.2178, which is 10.62%
above the correct value. In contrast, using the ME formula (1) gives an equity value of 20.7949, which is 0.93% below the correct valuation. While this is a relatively small error, in other examples the error from using the ME formula is substantially larger. This example illustrates the two central issues addressed by this paper: First, any flows-to-equity valuation method involves a releveraging formula for the cost of equity. Each formula makes implicit assumptions about the risk of PVTS, the debt strategy, and other factors which we discuss in section 4 below. For the valuation method to be legitimate these assumptions need to be consistent. Second, the correct valuation method is always that given by no-arbitrage valuation (see for example, Berk and DeMarzo 2007) . The most transparent way to derive this value is to use APV. However, the flows-to-equity method is commonly used in practice. Therefore, it is important to know what flows-to-equity valuation procedure corresponds to the correct APV value when particular assumptions are made about the debt policy. The answer to this question is known for the specific cases involving a constant amount of debt or a constant proportion of debt (see, for instance, Cooper and Nyborg 2007) .
However, the correct procedure with a changing debt plan has not been derived and that is the purpose of this paper.
In the next section, we develop a releveraging formula which always results in the correct value using the flows-to-equity method (i.e. the same as the no-arbitrage value derived using the adjusted present value calculation). In the following section we then extend the formula to include other realistic features of highly leveraged transactions.
A releveraging formula assuming zero NPV debt and no distress costs
In this section we derive our basic results using a simplified model with a fixed debt plan, fairly priced debt, and no costs of financial distress. In the next section we allow for mispriced debt and costs of financial distress. Throughout, we consider a project funded with debt that will amortize according to a fixed schedule. The project has expected after tax unlevered cash flows of C(t). The debt face value at time t will be D(t). The promised yield on the debt is fixed at Y and the corporate tax rate is T.
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We assume that the discount rate for the unlevered flows is constant and equal to U R .
The unlevered value, ( ) U V t , is calculated by discounting the unlevered free cash flows (after corporate taxes) at the unlevered discount rate:
The fundamental APV relationship always gives the correct value, and we use it to derive the correct discount rate formulas:
where ( ) L V t is the levered value at time t, and ( ) PVTS t is the present value at time t of the debt tax saving from that date onwards. All leverage-adjusted discount rates are derived from (6). The reason that particular formulas differ is because they make different assumptions about the size and risk of PVTS (see Cooper and Nyborg 2004) .
The value of equity can be calculated from the APV formula as:
However, the point of the flows-to-equity method is to obtain the equity value by discounting the equity free cash flow, which is defined as:
where Y is the yield (or coupon) on the debt. The equity discount rate,
defined implicitly as the rate required to give the correct value of the equity by discounting equity flows and values period-by-period:
where the equity values and equity free cash flow are given by (7) and (8). Hence a consistent flows-to-equity valuation procedure is the one that delivers an equity value from equation (9) which is the same as that calculated using equation (7).
There is one slightly unusual feature of this procedure which is worthy of note.
Although the approach is standard, the definition of equity free cash flow (8) mixes the expected cash flow from operations with a promised debt payment. Since the promised debt yield is not equal to the expected cash flow on the debt the equity free cash flow given by (9) is not equal to the expected cash flow on equity. Nevertheless, this definition of equity free cash flow is used in the standard version of the flows-toequity method. However, since the equity discount rate is used to discount this hybrid cash flow it is important to realise that the correct discount rate to use in the procedure is not exactly equal to the expected return on equity.
Implementation of the flows-to-equity method requires the calculation of ( )
starting from the unlevered cost of capital, U R . The relationship between them can be derived from equations (5)- (9) with one further assumption. The crucial extra ingredient is an assumption about the risk of PVTS. This is the fundamental difference between the ME approach and the MM approach. For a fixed debt plan, the relevant assumption is that the risk of the debt tax shield is the same as the risk of the debt, which is also the MM assumption. With a fixed debt plan and simplifying 2 Although we treat the interest rates as fixed, the same approach can be used with variable rate debt.
assumptions regarding the treatment of tax losses, Cooper and Nyborg (2008) show that the value of the debt tax shield is given by:
where Y is the promised yield on the debt. This assumes that (A1) the amount of debt at every future date is determined at time zero and will not change if the firm does not default, (A2) the debt is fairly priced, (A3) if the debt defaults there is zero recovery, and (A4) there are no costs of financial distress. Hence the only effect of debt on the total after-tax cash flow of the firm is through the debt tax shield.
Appendix 1 shows that that, with the assumptions (A1)-(A4), ( ) E R t is given by:
Result 1: (Proof: Appendix 1): With a fixed debt plan the equity discount rate is given by:
The equity discount rate is subscripted with time because the key point of the flowsto-equity method is that the discount rate varies over time as the leverage ratio varies.
There are two differences between (11) and the standard formula (4). One is that the second term contains the spread over the debt yield (R U -Y) rather than the spread over the riskless rate (R U -R F ). This lowers the equity discount rate and therefore raises the estimated equity value. The reason is that the equity free cash flow has already had the full debt yield deducted from it. Ignoring this in the releveraging formula essentially double-counts the spread of the risky debt. The second difference is that the leverage in (11) is lowered by PVTS. This also reduces the equity discount rate and increases estimated equity value. The reason for the difference is that the tax shields arising from the fixed debt plan have a low level of risk and do not, therefore, increase the equity discount rate by as much as ME formulas like (4) assume.
To see the relationship between (10) and the standard MM and ME formulas, we define a variable which measures PVTS relative to its standard MM level:
α is the present value of debt tax shields divided by the tax shield that would arise from a fixed amount of permanent debt at the level D(t). In general for HLT's the value of ( ) t α will be less than one, because the level of debt will be expected to reduce over time. We can now restate (11) as:
If ( ) 1 t α = , this collapses to the MM formula, (2), with the debt yield used as the cost of debt. If ( ) 0 t α = it collapses to the ME formula, (1), with the debt yield used as the cost of debt. Thus ( ) t α adjusts the releveraging formula to reflect the extent of the fixed debt plan. Using (13), we have a releveraging formula for the cost of equity that should be used in the flows-to-equity method. It is easily verified that using this formula in the example in Section 2 gives the same value as the standard APV procedure.
The intuition of the formula is that the ME formula applies whenever the risk of PVTS is the same as the risk of the operating cash flows (Cooper and Nyborg 2006) .
The MM formula applies to perpetual debt which generates PVTS with the same risk as the debt. In this case the variable ( ) t α is measuring the size of the PVTS resulting from the fixed debt plan as a proportion of that which would result from permanent debt.
From the perspective of implementation, a potential drawback with (11) and (13) is that they require the calculation of PVTS(t) at every date. Next, we show that ( ) t α can be related to the duration of the debt, so that it can be calculated directly without first calculating PVTS(t).
Define the conventional duration of the aggregate cash flows in the fixed debt plan by:
where ( ) B t i + is the total cash flow going to the debt holders at time ( ) 
Generalization of the model: Negative NPV debt and costs of distress
In the previous section we assumed that there are no costs of financial distress and that debt is priced to have zero NPV to the shareholders of the borrowing firms.
However, Almeida and Philippon (2007) have shown that distress costs can have a substantial effect on the net benefit of debt. This effect is likely to be especially important for highly leveraged transactions, so in this section we incorporate the costs of financial distress into our valuation procedure. Furthermore, one of the stated benefits of the flows-to-equity approach is that it can handle debt which has an interest rate above a "fair" rate. We define a fair interest rate as the rate which would have a zero NPV to shareholders of the borrowing firm, excluding the financing sideeffects and incorporate this into our valuation formula.
We use a simplified version of the model given in Almeida and Philippon (2007) .
Essentially, we extend their analysis to derive its implications for the flows-to-equity valuation method. We maintain the assumption (A1) of a fixed debt plan and replace assumptions (A2)-(A4) with more general assumptions: (A2') part of the debt spread exceeds fair compensation for default risk and therefore represents a loss of NPV to equity-holders, (A3') costs of financial distress are experienced only when debt defaults, (A4') in default the value of the firm falls by a fixed proportion of the face value of the debt, (A5) The marginal probability of default per period is constant. The justifications for the new assumptions are as follows. Assumptions (A2') and (A4') are simple generalisations. Almeida and Philippon provide a justification for (A3'). We base our assumption (A5) on the idea that HLT's are structured to match the maturity structure of debt to the profile of the underlying cash flows. One way of doing this would be to make the debt structure generate a constant marginal probability of default, which is what we assume.
We wish to value the firm from the perspective of the original equity-holders. The side-effects of financing now include the tax shield from debt, distress costs, and the effect of expensive debt. We assume that if default occurs distress costs are a fixed proportion of the face value of debt prior to default. The logic is that the firm value at default will be related to the amount of debt which has triggered default and the distress costs will be a proportion of the firm value. When expensive debt is issued we allow for its effect in the following way. The impact of the expensive debt on the equity-holders is the amount by which the promised yield exceeds the fair yield that would be required to compensate debt-holders for default risk. This loss of value occurs when the firm is solvent, but is zero in the default state.
We introduce some additional notation:
• Fair promised yield on debt from point of view of equity-holders: y
• Recovery rate in default per dollar face value of debt: ρ
• Financial distress cost per dollar face value of debt: φ Table 2 shows these financing side-effects in a single-period version of the model. In order to calculate the APV value of the firm, these are the components we need to value. 
Figure 1: Evolution of the APV components in the multiperiod model
To derive the equity discount rate using these assumptions, we start from the APV formula as before:
where PVFS(t) is the present value at time t in the solvent state of all future financing side-effects shown in Figure 1 (including the probability of distress costs at future dates). To determine PVFS we need a risk-adjusted probability to use in the valuation tree. As in the simple case, we derive the risk-adjusted probability from the condition for fairly-priced debt. Under the risk-neutral probability of default, q, this must have an expected return equal to the riskless rate. Fairly priced debt pays (1+y) per dollar of face value if it does not default and ( ) 1 y ρ + if it does default. So: 
Solving for q gives:
The components of the adjusted present value can be valued using this probability in ( )( ) ( )
PVFS t D t i q YT R
Where:
Equations (20) and (21) depend on q, which is defined by (19). We define:
We then have:
This differs from the simple case in two ways. First, it uses an adjusted tax rate,
that includes the effects of negative NPV debt and costs of financial distress. Second, it uses an adjusted yield that allows for the effect of the recovery rate. Note that when ρ = then y γ = , so that the adjusted yield is equal to the fair yield and we "discount" the APV components at y , as in the simple case.
Using the same basic procedure as for Result 1, but with PVFS given by (24) instead of PVTS given by (10), we get:
Result 3: (Proof: Appendix 3) Using an interest rate of γ , define the conventional duration of the aggregate debt cash flows by:
where B γ (t + i) be the total cash flow going to the debt holders at time ( ) t i + :
We have The reason why Y appears in (29) derives from the expression for PVFS(t) in (24), where Y also appears. Esty (1999) develops an example using the flows-to-equity method. We will use this example to illustrate the potentially large differences in valuation generated when using the standard formulas for the cost of equity, as compared with the formulas we have developed above. 
The size of the effects: Which adjustments matter most?
where
• R F is the riskfree rate, which is assumed to be 8%
• P is the risk premium, which is assumed to be 7.4%
• β U is the unlevered asset beta, which is assumed to be 0.6
• β E (t) is the beta of the equity in period t, which is calculated according to:
where:
We show in Appendix 5 that this approach gives the same answer as using the capital cash flow (CCF) approach when debt is risk-free. In this approach, the free cash flows available to the combination of debt and equity are discounted at the unlevered cost of equity, thus implicitly discounting tax shields at the cost of unlevered equity (see Ruback 2002) . Thus Esty's approach is correct whenever the CCF approach is correct (see Cooper and Nyborg (2007) for conditions when this holds). The problem is that the high leverage in the types of transaction we are considering means that debt is rarely risk-free. In fact the promised yield on the debt in Esty's example is 10%, which is well above the riskless interest rate. The spread on the debt must represent either a reward for risk or expensive debt, or both. We return to this below in the context of the example.
The procedure used in Table 3 is the same dynamic procedure as in Table1, Panel B.
The leverage ratio changes over time and thus the cost of equity does too. The 4 th column from the left gives the present value of the equity at the beginning of a period, say t. This is calculated by taking the value in the previous period, t -1, multiplying it by 1 + R E (t -1) and subtracting the equity cash flow at t. Given E(t), we can then calculate in succession V L (t), L(t), β E (t), and R E (t). The valuation is done in a spreadsheet by searching for the equity value at time 0 that gives an ex cash flow equity value of 0 in the final period. Since the tax shield is implicitly part of the equity cash flow, the valuation in Table 2 gives the adjusted net present value. As seen, the APV of the equity net of the initial investment of 300,000 is 106,688.
The project described in Table 3 generates cash flows for 25 years. The equity cash flows presented in the table are calculated by Esty based on operating cash flows (see Esty, 1999) . 5 For Esty's calculation the way the equity cash flows are derived is not important, given the debt profile. However, in Table 4 we show a set of operating cash flows which are consistent with the equity cash flows and debt schedule in Table   3 .
6 Table 3 is based on Exhibit 4 in Esty (1999) . 6 These are different to Esty's operating cash flows because he does not include the tax saving from debt in his definition of the equity cash flow and his calculation implicitly assumes that interest is paid in advance. We have constructed a set of operating cash flows that are consistent with the standard method of switching between operating free cash flow and equity cash flow. Table 5 values the same equity cash flows as in Table 3 but using our formula (13) for R E (t). Here we have used Y = 10%, consistent with what is assumed in Esty's example. The result is an NPV of 264,608, almost twice as much as using the cost of equity formula (4). The reason for this dramatic increase in value (APV) is that equation (4) overstates the cost of equity. For example, in Year 2, Esty estimates R E to be 18.3%, whereas our formula yields an R E of 14.5% --a difference of 3.8%.
During the period the debt is outstanding the average difference in R E (t) between the two procedures is 2.1%, with the difference being larger at short horizons than at long horizons. Our results differ from Estys' for two reasons. First, equations (3) and (4), used by Esty, assume that the debt has a beta of zero, even though the interest rate on the debt is 2% above the risk-free rate. This inflates the estimated equity beta because all the risk of the project is assumed to be carried by the equity even though some risk is in fact borne by the debt. Second, equation (3) assumes that the risk of the tax shield is equal to the risk of the firm even though the debt policy is fixed. Both effects overstate the equity discount rate and thereby undervalue the value of the project.
If the debt in Esty's example is indeed risk-free, yet pays a 2% premium over the riskfree rate, the implicit assumption is that a portion of the project's APV is given to creditors. That the debt is underpriced in this way is, of course, possible in a real-life situation. As argued by Esty, one of the advantages of the flows-to-equity approach is that it looks at the valuation from shareholders' perspective, without assuming that the debt is priced fairly. In contrast the standard approach where one first values the firm and then subtracts the face value of debt to get the value of equity assumes that the debt is fairly priced. Esty's method implicitly assumes that the entire 2% interest premium represents debt underpricing (or, equivalently, an excessive interest rate).
We can make Esty's approach consistent with fairly priced debt by using equation (1) rather than equation (4) to set the equity discount rate. This makes the discount rate depend on the debt yield, Y, rather than the riskless rate. The reason that it is consistent with fairly priced debt is that the standard definition of equity cash flow deducts the full debt yield as a cost, as we have noted above. Alternatively, using the CAPM an interest rate of 10% gives an implied debt beta of approximately 2/7.4, or 0.27. 7 Working through Esty's example with this value and the formula for the equity beta being the standard one, i.e.,
we get an APV of 227,565. This is still too low, as compared with the valuation based on our formula. The source of the undervaluation is still an equity discount rate that is too high. For example, R E (2) is now 15.3% -lower than before, but still too high compared with our estimate in Table 3 .
The reason for the remaining difference can be seen by comparing equation (1) with equation (13). Equation (1) assumes that α(t) = 0, which is equivalent to assuming that PVTS has a risk equal to the risk of the operating free cash flow rather than the risk of the debt. Since the method implicitly overestimates the risk of PVTS it underestimates the value of equity. In Table 6 we show the sensitivity of the equity value to different assumptions. The first column is Esty's calculation, from Table 3 above. The second column is the Esty method with equity discount rate calculated using the debt yield rather than the riskless rate. As discussed above this makes a large difference and is the most important element of the calculation to treat consistently in this particular example.
The other columns are calculated using a cost of equity given by equation (13) above.
The first of these is the base case analyzed in Table 3 . The next column shows the effect of assuming that half the debt spread is excessive, so the fair debt spread is 9% rather than 10%. The final three columns show the effect of distress costs and debt recovery assumptions. The parameter values are from Almeida and Philippon (2007) .
Each of the changes in assumption has a material effect on the valuation. In combination they give a wide range of values. The net effect of the correct assumptions in any particular situation will vary and cannot be predicted without using a consistent treatment of the equity discount rate.
Concluding Remarks
We have developed formulas for tax adjusted discount rates in highly levered transactions. Our formulas are best interpreted as being suitable for project finance or other structures where the amount of debt follows a predictable pattern, conditional on solvency. Our analysis is concerned with developing a consistent method for using the flows-to-equity method. This is nontrivial when the leverage ratio changes over time. The appropriate discount rate for equity flows varies over time with the duration of the debt. Using an example from Esty (1999) , we show that the values we get with our approach for equity values and discount rates can be substantially different from those obtained from standard approaches.
We have extended the basic framework to allow for debt which has a higher than fair interest rate, distress costs, and recovery in default. The formulas in this general scenario parallel those in the simpler case, but involve modified tax and interest rates.
These modifications depend on the extent to which yield spread on the debt is unfair, the level of distress costs, and recovery rates.
Although we focus on the flows-to-equity method, there are alternatives which can be used to value highly leveraged transactions. The WACC and capital cash flow approaches can be used to incorporate the tax benefit of debt directly in the DCF calculation (see Cooper and Nyborg (2007) for a review). Alternatively, adjusted present value (APV) can be used to separately calculate the tax benefit of the debt (Arzac 1996) . We have shown the links between the three approaches and how all the features which the flows-to-equity method is designed to capture can also be included in the APV approach. In practice, implementing the flows-to-equity approach correctly is more complicated than using APV. Since the consistent version of the flows-to-equity approach is derived from the APV formula we believe that it is an open question as to whether the flows-to-equity method can achieve anything that APV cannot.
The analysis that we have discussed assumes that the debt will be run down to zero as the project matures. An obvious extension would be to run the leverage down to a target level and then assume that the leverage ratio stays constant from that point onwards. This could be accommodated in our analysis by switching the debt policy to a standard Miles-Ezzell policy from the time the leverage ratio drops to the target level. Alternatively, one could assume that the debt level will be increased if the investment is successful. In that case the valuation should include the option value of increasing the tax shield in those circumstances.
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Rearranging (A1.4) gives equation (11) of the main text.
Appendix 2: The relationship between ( ) t α and duration.
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